This research report examines the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, all major and important events are added into this research paper providing a wide range of perspectives. The following document contains events starting from historical backgrounds to the ongoing war as of June 2025. It discusses the key events, including the 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Soviet-era Holodomor, the 1954 Crimea transfer, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion. The report analyzes the competing narratives of Russia and Ukraine, with Russia asserting historical and strategic claims over Ukraine as a buffer against NATO, and Ukraine emphasizing its sovereignty and pro-Western aspirations. It details the conflict’s human toll, with over 100,000 Ukrainian military casualties, 13,341 civilian deaths, and 16 million displaced, alongside Russia’s economic losses and reliance on allies like North Korea. International responses, including UN resolutions, ICC investigations, and $118 billion in U.S. aid to Ukraine, are assessed, highlighting geopolitical divides and enforcement challenges. The report proposes solutions such as renewed peace talks, increased humanitarian aid, war crime accountability, security guarantees, disinformation countermeasures, and internationally supervised referendums to address territorial disputes. Drawing on diverse sources, it provides a comprehensive overview of the conflict’s historical, legal, and humanitarian dimensions, aiming to inform pathways toward peace and justice.
(Note: Quotes and hooks added in this report does not in anyway promote any kind of hate or any narrative, rather just for informational use only)
The Russian Ukrainian conflict traces its origins back to Kyivan Rus’ (9th–13th centuries), a federation of East Slavic tribes centered in Kyiv, revered as the cultural and spiritual cradle of both nations. In the year 988 adoption of Christianity under Prince Volodymyr the Great forged a shared Orthodox identity, but the state’s collapse after Mongol invasions in the 1240s split the region. Western Ukraine fell under Lithuanian and Polish rule, bringing up cultural autonomy, while eastern Ukraine aligned with the Muscovite state, which would later be Russia. This division set the stage for competing identities, with Russia later claiming Kyivan Rus’ as its own to justify influence over Ukraine.
In 1654, the Treaty of Pereyaslav reshaped relations. Facing Polish oppression, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, leader of the Cossack Hetmanate, allied with Russia’s Tsar Alexis, securing military protection in exchange for allegiance. It brought Left-Bank Ukraine under Russian protection in exchange for military support against Poland. The treaty’s ambiguous terms, Russia saw it as incorporation, Ukraine as a temporary alliance sparked enduring disputes. Russia cites it as historical justification for dominance, while Ukraine views it as a loss of sovereignty which is still a debate central to modern sovereignty discussions. By the 19th century, the Russian Empire’s Russification policies banned Ukrainian language and publications, promoting a “tripartite” identity of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians as one people. In contrast, western Ukraine, under Austro-Hungarian rule, or Taras Shevchenko, whose poetry became a beacon of Ukrainian identity.
“There is no flag large enough to cover the shame of killing innocent people” ~ Howard Zinn
In 1922 Ukraine integrated into the Soviet Union as one of its founding republics after the Bolsheviks defeated Ukrainian independence forces during the Russian Civil War. This integration into the Soviet Union brought both promise and pain. Early korenizatsiya policies revived Ukrainian culture by promoting local languages and other local cultures, but Joseph Stalin’s regime imposed Russification, suppressing national identity, its main goal was to unify the USSR under a single Soviet identity, and suppress national independence movements that threatened Soviet authority. He saw diverse ethnic identities, like Ukrainian nationalism which was seen as a risk to political stability and communist unity. As for the results, the whole Russification process worked only partially, it succeeded in spreading the Russian language and suppressing local cultures for a time, especially through education, censorship, and forced migration. However, it also fueled deep resentment, especially in Ukraine and the Baltic states, and ultimately failed to erase national identities. These suppressed identities later reemerged strongly after the USSR collapsed.
The Holodomor (1932–1933), is considered as a man made famine during Stalin's regime, killed 3.5–7 million Ukrainians through grain seizures and collectivization. Recognized by 26 countries as a genocide, it targeted Ukrainian peasants resisting Soviet control, though Russia frames it as a broader agricultural failure. Even Professor Timothy Snyder stated in his research “The Soviet state used starvation as a political weapon against Ukraine.” Bloodlands (2010), Yale University Press. This tragedy, potentially violating the 1948 Genocide Convention’s intent to destroy a national group, remains a cornerstone of Ukrainian memory and a point of contention in international law discussions. While the UN has not officially declared it a genocide, the European Parliament (2008) recognized the Holodomor as a crime against humanity and a deliberate act of policy. Dozens of countries, including Canada, the U.S, Ukraine, and Poland, have declared it genocide based on evidence from both Western and post-Soviet scholars. Still it is debated whether it was actual Genocide or widespread catastrophe keeping this in mind that according to UN Genocide Convention article 2 clearly emphasises on the intent of the act.
World War II Created more divisions. Ukraine lost millions as a battleground, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), led by Stepan Bandera, collaborated with Nazi Germany to resist Soviet rule. Ukraine celebrates Bandera as a liberation hero; Russia condemns him as a Nazi collaborator, leveraging this to challenge Ukraine’s moral standing.
In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea to Ukraine, citing Soviet administrative logic and Khrushchev framed the transfer as a “gift” to the Ukrainian people to celebrate this “eternal friendship” between Russians and Ukrainians. Keeping this in mind that Ukraine was still under the USSR. On 19 February 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree formally transferring Crimean Oblast from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR, a move later ratified by the Supreme Soviets of both republics, which make this whole transferring and Gift situation legal stand ground. Russia later framed this as an injustice, fueling its 2014 annexation, which violated the Helsinki Final Act (1975)’s principle of territorial integrity.
What looked legal in Soviet procedure may not have been constitutional. Considering the Article 49 of the Constitution of USSR 1936, the presidium did have that power that its decrees were legally binding as the had the power to order territorial changes which make it look completely legal, but at same time if it's looked through strict constitution lens it seems to bypassed Article 14, 15, and 1, No public debate, no referendum, and no formal treaty between the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR which made this whole gifting unconstitutional but still legal. In 2015, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation reviewed the 1954 transfer of Crimea from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The office concluded that the transfer was unconstitutional, arguing that neither the Constitution of the RSFSR nor the Constitution of the USSR allowed the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to change the territorial status of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), such as Crimea. Therefore, they claimed the decision violated the constitutional process in place at the time.
However, Mark Kramer, Director of Cold War Studies at Harvard University, refuted this claim. He argued that the transfer complied with Article 18 of the USSR Constitution, which states that “the territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent.” Both the Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR parliaments had approved the transfer, thus fulfilling that requirement. Kramer also emphasized that Soviet law was often symbolic and not strictly followed in practice. He added that Russia had officially recognized Crimea as part of Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union specifically in the 1991 Belavezha Accords and again in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, where Russia pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
“When law becomes tyranny, rebellion becomes duty” ~
Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, when its parliament declared sovereignty following the failed Moscow coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. This was confirmed by a nationwide referendum on December 1, 1991, with around 92.3% results, marking a bold break from the Soviet Union, but its Russian speaking east and economic reliance on Russia posed challenges.
The Budapest Memorandum (1994) was a landmark, with Ukraine surrendering its nuclear arsenal, third largest globally for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. Article 1 of the memorandum obligated Russia to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders, a promise broken in 2014, undermining trust in international non-proliferation agreements. Keeping in mind that Budapest Agreement was a political agreement not a formal treaty, thus it does not have any strong legally binding nature.
The Orange Revolution (2004) exposed Ukraine’s internal rift. Allegations of electoral fraud favoring Viktor Yanukovych (pro-Russian) sparked protests, leading to Viktor Yushchenko’s pro Western victory. This uprising signaled democratic aspirations but deepened east-west divides, with Russia alleging Western interference. These tensions set the stage for Ukraine’s struggle to balance Russian ties with European ambitions.
In November 2013, President Yanukovych’s rejection of an EU trade deal, which was seen as Russian influenced, sparked the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti.
Euromaidan protests erupted in response to President Viktor Yanukovych’s rejection of a deal aimed at strengthening economic ties with the European Union, and supporting pro Russian goals which ultimately led to the Revolution of Dignity. Demanding democracy and European integration, the protests faced a brutal crackdown in February 2014, killing over 100. Which led Yanukovych to flee the country in February 2014. Yanukovych’s ousting was celebrated in Ukraine as a victory for sovereignty; Russia called it a “Western-backed coup”.
Little Green Men: Right after that, Pro Russian Protests started to erupt in southeastern Ukraine. Soon unmarked troops (also known as: little Green Men by the Ukrainian and “Polite People” by Russian media) started to take position in the Crimea region, Russia first denied any involvement with them initially calling them “Local Self-Defence Units” but right after annexation they admitted their role as Special Russian Task Force.
After a month of the Revolution of Dignity, in March 2014, Russian special forces started to take control over the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin called out the need to protect the rights of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and southeast Ukraine. Russia then formally annexed the peninsula after 93% Crimeans voted to join the Russian Federation in a disputed local referendum. The crisis heightened ethnic divisions, and two months later, pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held independence referendums.
Russia’s response, annexing Crimea in February 2014 with unmarked forces clearly violated UN Charter Article 2(4), prohibiting the use of force against a state’s territorial integrity. A disputed referendum, condemned internationally, claimed Crimeans favored Russia, marking Europe’s first annexation since World War II (Britannica, 2025).
Russian-backed separatists then seized Donetsk and Luhansk, forming the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The War in Donbas, killing over 14,000 by 2021, saw Russia violate the Minsk Protocol (2014) and Minsk II (2015), which mandated ceasefires and Ukrainian border control (OSCE, 2015). These agreements’ failures highlight challenges in enforcing international peace accords.(International Crisis Group, 2025).
“War is what happens when language fails” ~ Margaret Atwood
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full scale invasion, aiming to topple Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. The war has caused over 100,000 Ukrainian military casualties and displaced millions, with Russia occupying about 20% of Ukraine by June 2025 (Institute for the Study of War, 2025). Russia’s actions, including the Kakhovka Dam’s destruction in June 2023, violated Geneva Convention Protocol I (1977), Article 56, protecting civilian infrastructure (ICRC, 1977). Ukraine’s resistance, increased by a $61 billion Western aid package, includes the Spider Web drone strikes and a June 2025 prisoner swap, reflecting resilience and diplomatic efforts (Kyiv Independent, 2024; Reuters, 2025).
Following points are necessary to keep in mind:
Russia views Ukraine as part of its historical sphere, rooted in Kyivan Rus’ and articulated by Vladimir Putin’s claim that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” (Kremlin, 2021). Strategically, Ukraine is a buffer against NATO, with Crimea vital for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Russia’s 2025 demands recognition of annexed territories and Ukraine’s neutrality—aim to secure regional dominance, citing grievances like Crimea’s 1954 transfer (Bowes Chay, 2025; CFR, 2025).
Russia also believes that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) are separate independent Republics and announced their independence in February 2022 by a presidential decree. Under this view, these republics could request military assistance from another sovereign, in this case Russia, as allowed in customary international law (similar to mutual defense pacts). Russia argues that once they are recognized as independent, Article 51 of the UN Charter (right to self-defense) applies to defending them against Ukrainian military actions. Immediately after recognition, Russia signed “friendship and mutual assistance treaties” with both entities.
These treaties provided the legal framework (from Russia’s perspective) to deploy Russian troops into Donbas in response to “Ukrainian aggression.” Russia treats this as a legal parallel to NATO style collective defense (e.g. Article 5 of NATO Charter). Russia accuses Ukraine of committing genocide or mass atrocities against Russian-speaking populations in Donetsk and Luhansk since 2014. This is used to invoke the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine, allowing intervention to prevent mass human rights abuses, considering that Russia considers both DPR and LPR as separate independent republics then that's the stand point where the R2P comes in effect.
Russia also argues that Ukraine failed to implement the 2015 Minsk II Agreement, which aimed to give autonomy to Donbas within Ukraine. It claims Kyiv instead escalated hostilities and refused to negotiate directly with the breakaway republics. Russia often compares Donetsk and Luhansk to Kosovo, By setting a Precedence, in which it was recognized as independent by many Western countries despite Serbia’s objections. Moscow argues that if NATO could support Kosovo’s secession and defend it militarily (1999), Russia can do the same for Donbas. This is used to accuse the West of “double standards” in international law.
Russia’s core demands throughout the war in Ukraine have remained relatively consistent, centering around territorial, security, and ideological concerns.
One of the foremost demands is that Ukraine recognize Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, annexed in 2014, as well as the four regions Russia claimed in 2022 Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson following referendums widely condemned by the international community as illegitimate (UNGA Resolution ES-11/4, October 2022).
Another major demand is Ukraine’s formal neutrality, a binding guarantee that it will not join NATO or allow foreign military infrastructure on its soil. This was a key point in the early 2022 negotiations in Belarus and later in Istanbul, where Russian and Ukrainian delegations reportedly discussed Ukraine adopting a non aligned status in exchange for security guarantees from third party countries (source: Reuters, March 29, 2022).
Russia has also insisted on what it calls the “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine terms that have been heavily criticized abroad for their vagueness and propagandistic tone, though Moscow uses them to refer to removing Western influence and what it claims are extremist elements within Ukraine’s leadership and armed forces (Putin’s address, Feb 24, 2022).
Lastly, Russia has consistently tied any meaningful peace effort to the lifting of Western sanctions, arguing that negotiations are futile while such economic restrictions remain in place (source: TASS, July 2023).
These demands show Russia’s broader goals: securing strategic buffer zones, maintaining influence in the post Soviet space, and reshaping the European security order.
“An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind” ~ Mahatma Gandhi
Since 1991, Ukraine has forged a distinct identity through the 2019 language law and 2017 decommunization efforts, erasing Soviet symbols (Wilson Center, 2019). The 2018 Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s independence reduced Moscow’s religious influence, with its adherents dropping from 23.6% in 2010 to 12% by 2022 (Razumkov Centre, 2021). Support for NATO (62%) and EU (68%) membership by 2022 reflects a pro-Western shift (Rating Group, 2022).
Ukraine’s demands in the war with Russia have evolved over time but remain rooted in principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security. From the outset, Ukraine has insisted on the full withdrawal of Russian forces from all internationally recognized Ukrainian territory—including Crimea and the four regions Russia claimed to annex in 2022 (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson). This is consistent with UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 (March 2022), which reaffirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and condemned Russia’s invasion. A second major demand is legal accountability for Russian war crimes and aggression.
Security guarantees are also critical to Ukraine’s position. Kyiv seeks a binding framework—either through NATO membership or bilateral/multilateral security assurances—to prevent future invasions. This reflects skepticism about past guarantees, particularly the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for vague security assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK.
Other demands include the release of prisoners of war, the safe return of deported Ukrainian citizens (especially children), and the restoration of energy and food infrastructure damaged by the war. Reparations for war damages and the unblocking of ports and grain exports are also regularly mentioned in diplomatic forums.
Ukrainian leadership, particularly President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has repeatedly called for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute Russian officials, as highlighted in his 10-point peace plan presented to the G20 in November 2022 (source: Ukrinform, Nov 2022). In Zelenskyy’s peace formula, which includes: radiation and nuclear safety, food security, energy security, release of all prisoners and deportees, restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, withdrawal of Russian troops, justice, environmental safety, prevention of escalation, and confirmation of war's end. These were officially presented to both Western allies and the Global South to frame Ukraine's negotiating stance.
Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, had always allegedly tried to seek territorial control over Crimea and eastern Ukraine to counter NATO and maintain regional dominance. It annexed Crimea in 2014, supported separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, and occupied about 20% of Ukraine as of 2025. Economic losses are estimated at $1.3 trillion by 2025, with military expenditures reaching $250 billion by autumn 2024, though Russia benefits from Ukraine’s raw materials, valued at over $26 trillion Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Despite peace talks, like the 2025 Istanbul negotiations, Russia rejected a U.S. proposal in April 2025. Internal dissent, with 57% favoring peace in October 2022, is underreported Peace Negotiations.
Reports indicate Russia has deployed approximately 12,000 North Korean troops, including elite Storm Corps members, to support operations in Kursk, trained in Russia and disguised in Russian uniforms with fake identities, as confirmed by North Korea in April 2025 North Korean Involvement. South Korea reported over 1,000 North Korean casualties by December 2024, while Ukraine claimed 3,000 BBC: North Korean Troops. Russia is accused of using North Korean ballistic missiles, claimed by the U.S. to violate UN sanctions, though Russia denies this, as reported by Reuters. Although mostly motivated by geopolitical strategy, Russia also agreed to the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Deal (July 2022) allowing Ukrainian grain exports during wartime to alleviate global food insecurity—arguably a form of temporary humanitarian cooperation.
Ukraine has relied heavily on U.S. military aid with an amount totaling over $66 billion since 2022, covering advanced weaponry, intelligence, air defenses, and logistics accounting for roughly 60% of its externally sourced arms. Analysts and many researchers warn that if U.S. support were abruptly halted, Ukraine might sustain its defense using existing stockpiles and rising European aid for about six months but beyond that, its ability to retaliate and defend Russian offensives, particularly in air defense and precision strikes, would be severely compromised.
European nations have stepped in significantly, with the EU and member states delivering approximately €72 billion in military aid between January and April 2025 surpassing U.S. monthly contributions for the first time. Yet these efforts, while substantial in financial terms, fall short in replacing U.S. high end systems like Patriot missiles, satellite intelligence, and long-range precision munitions.
Public sentiment remains wary of compromise: as of mid-2024, about 58% of Ukrainians opposed any territorial concessions to Russia, though roughly a third indicated they might consider de facto accommodations, short of formal recognition, if given solid security guarantees. Meanwhile, modest progress has been made in peace negotiations, with agreements on prisoner exchanges and humanitarian pauses but no breakthrough on political settlements.
The human toll remains immense. By early 2023, around 8 million Ukrainians were internally displaced, with another 8 million registered as refugees marking Europe’s most significant displacement crisis since World War II. Civilian casualties number in the tens of thousands, and military deaths in the hundreds of thousands, underscoring the ongoing severity of the conflict.
Both Russia and Ukraine face accusations of war crimes. UN reports and independent investigations show Ukraine has executed some Russian POWs but on a far smaller scale than documented Russian abuses. But the UN reported executions from both sides. The case of the Mala Rohan incident in March 2022 was highlighted by the UN as a credible example of torture and execution of Russian soldiers. Ukrainian authorities assert these actions fall within legal frameworks, and Western led oversight continues to monitor compliance.
The United States, under the administrations of both President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump, has provided substantial support to Ukraine, contributing over $50 billion in aid by February 2023. This assistance has included advanced military equipment such as M777 howitzers, Stryker armored vehicles, Humvees, NASAMS and Patriot missile systems, Javelin and Stinger missiles, drones, and large quantities of ammunition. While official figures place total aid at around $60 billion, some economists estimate the actual value to be closer to $18.3 billion due to U.S. accounting practices and depreciation adjustments. In March 2025, former President Trump briefly froze aid during negotiations involving Saudi-led ceasefire discussions, before later approving $50 million in direct arms sales to Ukraine in April 2025. Alongside military support, the U.S. has imposed extensive sanctions on Russia, including bans on SWIFT access for major Russian banks. However, domestic support for ongoing aid has declined, with public approval dropping from 46% to 41% between May and October 2023. Analysts have also criticized U.S. leadership for underestimating the scale and intent of Russia’s 2022 invasion, despite having received accurate intelligence in advance.
“A trail of blood is left behind whenever devil steps in” ~
NATO have a major role in this whole conflict from the Russian side the allegations on USA and NATO can be heard clearly accusing them for breaking the treaty and agreement for not expanding NATO not even an inch east wards but still NATO expanded eastwards and kept expanding till it started to become open threat to the Russian soil, But from NATO’s perspective it has taken an “Open Door Policy” based on Article 10 of its founding treaty.
2008 Bucharest Summit: NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”, without setting a timeline which Russia viewed as provocative and cited it as a factor in the 2008 war in Georgia and its 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine.
NATO insists that its expansion is defensive, not aimed at threatening Russia. But Russia tends to bring up Past actions by NATO such as: 1999 bombing by NATO in Yugoslavia without an legal UN approval, 2011 Libyan Intervention and Afghan intervention, with all these points Russia tends to prove its Right as mentioned in Article 2(4) of UN Charter that NATO imposes threats to sovereignty of Russia.
The Wagner Group, a Kremlin linked contractor, had been accused of deploying mercenaries, raising ethical concerns. It is accused of recruiting Russian prisoners with freedom promises, as claimed by human rights groups, with limited evidence of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Russian oligarchs fund and shape war efforts, but their roles are overshadowed. For example, Konstantin Malofeev financed 2014 Crimea actions, and Oleg Deripaska is accused of profiting via shell companies, based on prior context.
Multinational corporations, like Shell and BP, withdrew from Russia post 2022, impacting supply chains. Ethical dilemmas and energy disruptions are underreported. Some remaining companies are accused of indirectly funding the war through Russian taxes, as claimed by activists, though they assert sanction compliance as published by Harvard Law: Corporate Response.
The UN General Assembly’s 2022 vote (141–5) condemned Russia’s invasion, citing UN Charter Article 2(4) (OHCHR, 2022). The U.S. has provided $118 billion in aid, including $65 billion militarily (CFR, 2025). The International Criminal Court’s war crime charges, including for child deportations, invoke Geneva Convention violations (Britannica, 2025; ICRC, 1949). The international response to the Russian-Ukrainian war reflects diverse stances from major countries. The United States condemned Russia’s invasion, delivering over $118 billion in aid to Ukraine, including $65 billion in military support, and imposed sanctions targeting Russian banks. The United Kingdom condemned Russia’s actions, provided tanks and air defense systems, and supported Ukraine’s NATO aspirations.
Germany condemned Russia’s aggression, contributed €72 billion in EU aid, including Leopard tanks, and backed ICC probes while urging caution. France condemned the invasion, supplied military aid, and supported Zelenskyy’s peace proposals. Canada condemned Russia’s war crimes, offered C$2 billion in aid, and aligned with G7 efforts. China remained neutral, avoiding criticism of Russia, continuing economic ties, and abstaining from UN votes. India took a neutral stance, abstained from UN resolutions, and balanced ties with Russia and the West. Turkey condemned Russia’s invasion, mediated through the 2025 Istanbul talks, facilitated the Black Sea Grain Deal, and supported Ukraine’s integrity while maintaining economic relations with Russia.
The United Nations has been deeply involved in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which kicked off with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and intensified with the full scale invasion in 2022. The UN General Assembly took a strong stance early on with Resolution A/RES/68/262 on March 27, 2014, backing Ukraine’s sovereignty and rejecting Crimea’s annexation, with 100 countries voting in favor (UN Resolution A/RES/68/262).
After the 2022 invasion, the Assembly passed A/RES/ES-11/1 on March 2, 2022, calling for Russia to withdraw its forces, supported by 141 nations, and A/RES/ES-11/3 on April 7, 2022, which suspended Russia from the Human Rights Council (UN Resolution A/RES/ES-11/1, A/RES/ES-11/3). As for Russia's Referendums are concerned significant resolutions include A/RES/ES-11/4 on October 13, 2022, denouncing Russia’s illegal referendums in occupied territories, and A/RES/ES-11/5 on November 14, 2022, pushing for reparations for damages caused by Russia (UN Resolution A/RES/ES-11/4, A/RES/ES-11/5). In 2025, drafts L.10 and L.11, adopted on February 24, kept the pressure on for peace and condemned Russia’s actions (UN Draft L.10, L.11).
The Security Council, hampered by Russia’s veto power, still managed to pass S/RES/2166 on July 21, 2014, condemning the downing of flight MH17, and S/RES/2202 on February 17, 2015, endorsing the Minsk Agreements to de escalate the conflict (UN Resolution S/RES/2166, S/RES/2202). On February 24, 2025, S/RES/2774 urged a lasting peace, passing with 10 votes (UN Resolution S/RES/2774). The Human Rights Council set up an investigation through A/HRC/RES/49/1 on March 4, 2022, to probe war crimes, and earlier reports like A/HRC/28/64/Add.1 from 2015 highlighted human rights concerns in Crimea and beyond (UN Resolution A/HRC/RES/49/1, UN Report A/HRC/28/64/Add.1). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stepped in when Ukraine filed a case in 2022, ordering Russia on March 16, 2022, to stop its military operations, though Russia didn’t comply (ICJ Case). The International Criminal Court (ICC) went further, issuing arrest warrants on March 17, 2023, for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova for war crimes tied to the deportation of Ukrainian children (ICC Ukraine). On the humanitarian front, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) raised $3.32 billion in 2025 to help millions affected, while UNESCO worked to protect Ukraine’s cultural sites, documenting damage to over 50 locations (UN Appeal, UNESCO Program). Despite these efforts, the UN’s ability to enforce its decisions remains limited by geopolitical divides.
“Cities are reduced to ashes and hospitals are turned into graveyards, but what keeps happening is VETO by the devils” ~
Ukraine has been proactive at the UN, pushing for resolutions to rally international support. It spearheaded A/RES/ES-11/1 in 2022 to condemn Russia’s invasion and co-sponsored draft L.10 in 2025, which called for peace and reiterated Russia’s responsibility (UN Draft L.10). Ukraine also brought its case to the ICJ in 2022, challenging Russia’s genocide claims and securing provisional measures (ICJ Case). Additionally, Ukraine has worked with the Human Rights Council, contributing to reports like A/HRC/28/64/Add.1 and supporting the 2022 war crimes inquiry (UN Report A/HRC/28/64/Add.1).
Russia, meanwhile, has used its Security Council veto to block resolutions critical of its actions, notably on February 25, 2022 (UN Press). It proposed draft S/2023/212 on March 27, 2023, focusing on the Nord Stream pipeline incident, though it wasn’t adopted (UN Document S/2023/212). Russia also sponsored draft L.11 in 2025, initially framed as a neutral peace call but amended to align with Ukraine’s position, showing its attempt to shape the narrative (UN Draft L.11). Russia has consistently challenged the ICC’s jurisdiction over its officials and disputed the ICJ’s rulings, reflecting a defensive stance at the UN.
As of June 2025 verified data remain less, but available estimates provide some insight into the conflict’s human cost. According to the UN’s OHCHR, at least 13,341 Ukrainian civilians have been confirmed killed and 32,744 injured since February 2022 though the true numbers are likely much higher. In Russian controlled areas, OHCHR recorded an additional 2,698 civilian deaths and 4,402 injuries in a report by Reuters. Ukrainian officials report approximately 43,000 military dead and 370,000 wounded, based on remarks by President Zelensky in late 2024. They also estimate Russian military losses at nearly 990,000 casualties (killed and wounded; including around 250,000 killed). U.S. and Western sources offer slightly lower but still substantial estimates about 198,000 Russian troops killed and 550,000 wounded, with 43,000 Ukrainian dead and 370,000 wounded. Meanwhile, Russian authorities do not regularly publish civilian or military casualty figures and often claim Ukrainian losses far exceed their own, though such claims remain unverified by independent sources. There has been an indescribable increase in human losses from both fronts and the current situation suggests that the war isn't going to stop now, even tho many steps have been taken by both sides such as the Istanbul Talks, Minsk Agreements, 10 points for peace by Zelensky but still they are not being able to act upon them.
(Note: conclusion and possible solutions are not authors personal conclusion and solutions rather general conclusion and solutions, Author personal opinion and solutions shall be published separately)
The Russian Ukrainian conflict is an ongoing tragedy with deep historical roots, stretching back to the days of Kyivan Rus’ and going through centuries of shared yet contested history. From the 2014 annexation of Crimea to the devastating full scale invasion of 2022, this war has torn lives apart, displaced millions, and shaken the foundations of global stability. It’s not just about borders or politics it’s about people, with over 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers lost and countless civilians caught in the crossfire. Russia’s actions, like the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, and allegations of war crimes on both sides, including Ukraine’s reported prisoner executions, have left scars that will take generations to heal. The failure of agreements like the Minsk Protocols and the Budapest Memorandum shows how hard it is to keep promises in a world divided by power and distrust.
The world has responded 141 nations condemned Russia’s invasion at the UN, and the U.S. alone has poured $118 billion into supporting Ukraine. But Russia’s veto power at the Security Council and geopolitical rifts have limited what the UN can do. Ukraine fights on, fueled by Western aid and a fierce sense of identity, while Russia, strained economically and leaning on allies like North Korea, digs in. The human cost is staggering: at least 13,341 civilian deaths, 16 million displaced, and entire cities reduced to rubble. This isn’t just a war, it's a humanitarian crisis that demands we act with urgency and compassion.
This war has gone on too long, and the cost is too high. By focusing on peace, justice, and rebuilding, we can honor the resilience of the people and work toward a future where sovereignty and human dignity come first.
If any error or factual error is found please send it to: msnrzas@gmail.com.